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SAFEGUARDING EQUALITY FOR THE
HANDICAPPED: COMPENSATORY
RELIEF UNDER SECTION 504 OF
THE REHABILITATION ACT
The Rehabilitation Act of 19731 (the "Rehabilitation Act" or the
"Act") established a comprehensive federal plan aimed at improving the
opportunities available to handicapped persons. Section 504,2 the central
provision of the Act, prohibits discrimination against "otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individuals ' 3 in programs or activities that receive fed-
eral financial assistance.4 Although section 504 does not explicitly
establish a private right of action against discriminatory programs, 5 fed-
eral courts have uniformly agreed that an individual right of action is
implied. 6 There has been much less agreement, however, on the question
whether a compensatory damages remedy is available in an action
1. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1982)).
2. Id. § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)). The section
provides in part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual... shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service." Id
3. According to the rules issued under section 504, a handicapped person is "otherwise quali-
fied" if the individual, with reasonable accommodation, is capable of performing the "essential ele-
ments" of the task in question. See, eg., 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(1) (1985) (Department of Education
rules); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1985) (Health and Human Services rules).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
5. For a discussion of the absence of an explicit right of action under section 504, see Wegner,
The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handi-
cap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 414-16 (1984);
Comment, Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Is There An Implied Right of Action Under Section 504?, 49
TENN. L. REV. 577, 592-93 (1982).
6. Courts of appeals in ten circuits have held that section 504 implicitly confers a private right
of action. See Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985); Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Auth., 681 F.2d 1376, 1377 n.1 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); Miener v.
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 973-75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Pushkin v. Regents of
the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1376-80 (10th Cir. 1981); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d
316, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633
F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds; 106 S. Ct. 300 (1985); Carmi v. Metropolitan
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Camenisch
v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390
(1981); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1979); Davis v. Southeast-
ern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1159 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 397
(1979); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth.,
548 F.2d 1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir. 1977).
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brought under section 504.7
In 1978, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act (the "1978
amendments"),8 intending to eliminate the uncertainty as to the types of
relief available to victims of discrimination against the handicapped. In-
cluded among the 1978 amendments was section 505(a)(2), 9 which pro-
vides that the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by
any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal
provider of such assistance under section 504 of this Act."' 0 Courts had
previously allowed declaratory and injunctive relief in title VI actions,"'
and accordingly section 505(a)(2) makes such relief available to a section
504 plaintiff. Title VI, however, like section 504, neither explicitly per-
mits nor proscribes a damages remedy. In addition, at the time Congress
enacted section 505(a)(2), the Supreme Court had not yet declared that
compensatory relief was available under title VI.12 Thus, questions con-
cerning the availability of compensatory relief to the section 504 plaintiff
continue to be litigated.
This note examines the debate on the existence of a damages remedy
under section 504. The note reviews the Rehabilitation Act and the con-
gressional purpose underlying it.'1 The note then identifies the adminis-
trative remedies provided by regulations promulgated to implement the
Act 14 and analyzes relevant federal court decisions.' 5 The note con-
cludes that the protection afforded the handicapped under section 504
necessarily implies the right to compensatory relief.
This note also considers what showing a private plaintiff must make
7. Compare Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 977-79 (8th Cir.) (damages available under
section 504), cert denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982) with Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532
F. Supp. 460, 464-73 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (damages not available under § 504).
8. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as 1978 amendments].
9. Id § 120 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982)).
10. Id Title VI prohibits racial discrimination by employers and agencies that receive federal
funds earmarked to provide employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1982).
11. See, eg., Drayden v. Needville Indep. School Dist., 642 F.2d 129, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1981);
Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522, 527 (N.D. I1. 1980).
12. The question of the availability of damages under title VI was addressed in Guardians Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Though no opinion commanded a majority, the deci-
sion establishes that compensatory relief is available under that statute, but only for intentional
violations. Id at 607 n.27 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); see also
infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. This case was decided five years after the passage of the
1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act.
13. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
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in order to be entitled to compensatory relief under section 504.16 Specif-
ically, the note addresses the question whether the plaintiff must prove
discriminatory intent. This inquiry focuses on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 7 where a ma-
jority of the Justices limited compensatory relief under title VI to cases in
which intentional discrimination is proven. 8 Because section 505(a)(2)
links the remedies available under section 504 to those available under
title VI, some courts concluded from Guardians that damages may be
awarded in a section 504 action, but only after a showing of purposeful
discrimination. 19 This note demonstrates the inappropriateness of a stan-
dard requiring proof of discriminatory intent,20 and concludes that com-
pensatory relief should be awarded not only to the plaintiff who has been
subjected to deliberate discrimination but also to the plaintiff who has
suffered from discriminatory effects that could have been avoided had the
fund recipient made reasonable accommodation to account for the plain-
tiff's handicap.21
I. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
A. Private Cause of Action.
With the Rehabilitation Act, Congress introduced aggressive meas-
ures designed to bring handicapped citizens into the mainstream of
American society. Section 504 of the Act constituted the first national
declaration of the civil rights of the handicapped. In addition to guaran-
teeing equal rights for disabled individuals in federally aided programs, 22
the Act provides for certain procedures designed to integrate handi-
capped individuals into the community through expanded educational
and employment opportunities. 23 The Act recognizes that handicapped
16. See fnfra notes 82-120.
17. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
18. d at 607 n.27 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); see also infra
notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
19. See Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984); Marvin H. v.
Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1357 (5th Cir. 1983); Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp.
1132, 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1984). But see Wilder v. City of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1136
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (damages available without proof of discriminatory purpose).
20. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
23. Section 501 of the Act requires federal agencies to take affirmative action to hire disabled
persons. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982). Section 502 creates the Architectural and Transportation Barri-
ers Compliance Board to resolve problems created by structural and transportation barriers. Id.
§ 792. Section 503 requires federal contractors employed under contracts worth more than $2500 to
take affirmative steps toward hiring disabled persons. Id § 793(a). See Wegner, supra note 5, at 403
n.5.
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persons can become substantially more productive once they receive ba-
sic training and accordingly encourages the development of rehabilita-
tion services for even the most severely disabled.24 The Rehabilitation
Act thus seeks to integrate of handicapped individuals into mainstream
society as productive and independent citizens.
Aggressive implementation of the Act was not immediately forth-
coming. Although Congress had indicated that each agency administer-
ing federally funded programs should promulgate regulations to
implement section 504,25 no government agency initiated major steps to-
ward enforcement. 26 Even the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW),27 which was responsible for coordinating the implemen-
tation of section 504,28 proceeded sluggishly.29 HEW did not issue its
first set of regulations until four years after the enactment of section
50430 and then only in response to a federal court order.31
As federal departments and agencies moved slowly in enforcing sec-
tion 504, handicapped individuals who had been subjected to discrimina-
tory treatment turned to the courts for relief. Although the
Rehabilitation Act as originally enacted did not specifically outline a
course of remedial action for individual plaintiffs, the 1978 amendments
and their legislative history clearly support the view that section 504 does
afford a private right of action.32 The federal courts of appeals have uni-
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 723 (1982) (scope of vocational rehabilitation services provided under Re-
habiitation Act); see also The 504 Notice: Moving Toward a Civil Rights Act, AMICUs, July 1976, at
12 (discussing potential for increased productivity of disabled persons who receive rehabilitative
assistance).
25. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6373, 6390-91.
26. See Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 after Southeastern,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 171, 176 n.25 (1980).
27. In 1980, Congress replaced HEW with two new departments, the Department of Education
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Department of Education Organization
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 201, 509, 93 Stat. 671, 695 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3411, 3508
(1982)). Both Departments have promulgated regulations on section 504. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84
(1983) (HHS regulations); 34 C.F.R. pt. 104 (1983) (Department of Education regulations).
28. To hasten the drafting of regulations, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order in
1976 specifically providing that HEW oversee the implementation of section 504. Exec. Order No.
11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117-18 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 794 app. at 1074 (1982), revoked by Exec.
Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 300 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 app. at 23 (1982).
29. See Note, supra note 26, at 176 n.25.
30. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1977).
31. Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D.D.C. 1976) (ordering Secretary of HEW to
promulgate regulations effectuating section 504).
32. For example, section 505(b) of the Act, added in 1978, provides for an award of attorneys'
fees in actions brought to enforce section 504 rights. 1978 Amendments, supra note 8, § 120, 92
Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982)). In explaining the purpose of this provision,
the pertinent House report states:
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formly embraced this view.33 Although the Supreme Court has not di-
rectly addressed this issue,34 the analysis of the lower courts is supported
by Supreme Court decisions recognizing implied rights of action under
other federal statutes. 35
[D]isabled individuals are one of the very few minority groups in this country who have
not been authorized by Congress to seek attorney's fees. The amendment [section 505(b)]
proposes to correct this omission and thereby assist handicapped individuals in securing
the legal protection guaranteed them under Title V of the [Rehabilitation Act].
H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7312, 7332.
33. See supra note 6.
34. The Court had its first opportunity to construe the rights accorded under section 504 in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Frances Davis, a twenty-nine-year-
old student who suffered from a hearing disorder, asserted that Southeastern Community College
rejected her application for admission to a nursing program because of her impairment. Noting that
Davis could not meet the necessary requirements for safe and effective participation in the nursing
program because of her hearing disorder, the Court held that Davis was not an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual" and thus was not in the class of persons protected by section 504. Id. at
406, 409-14. The Court thus did not decide whether a person in a benefited class had a private right
of action.
In a more recent case, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), petitioner
Conrail abandoned its argument against the existence of a private right of action before the Court
could consider the issue. Id. at 630 n.7. The Court, however, noted that the lower courts had held
that a private right of action is available. Id.
35. A number of the lower courts have relied on the type of analysis used by the Supreme Court
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See
e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 973-75 (8th Cir.) (relying on Cort and Cannon to imply a
cause of action under section 504), cert denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982). The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged such use of Cannon by the lower courts in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,
630 n.7 (1984).
In Cannon, the Court used four factors first articulated in Cort to determine whether Congress
intended to establish a private right of action under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"-
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?. Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 688 n.9 (1979) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916))) (citations omitted).
Cases since Cannon have emphasized that, in determining whether a private right of action is to be
implied, the initial focus should be on legislative intent. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). As noted previously, supra note 32 and accompanying text, the
legislative history of section 505(b) of the Act, added with the 1978 amendments, demonstrates that
Congress regarded section 504 as affording a private right of action. Moreover, the legislative his-
tory of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 92 Stat. 1617, indicates
that Congress intended to use title VI as a model for remedies available under section 504. See, e.g.,
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373,
6390 (section 504 "patterned after and almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language" of title
VI).
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B. Availability of Damages.
The general agreement among the courts of appeals that section 504
confers a private judicial remedy leaves unresolved the question whether
compensatory relief can be awarded under the statute. As the Supreme
Court noted in Davis v. Passman, "[W]hether a litigant has a 'cause of
action' is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if
any, a litigant may be entitled to receive." '36
1. Congressional Purpose. Congress passed no explicit measure
allowing monetary damages. The legislative history of the Act, espe-
cially on the subject of damages, is not detailed.37 It is generally ac-
cepted, however, that federal courts may employ any available remedy to
right a wrong when legal rights have been invaded. 38 The availability of
damages is arguably most compelling where damages "are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose. '39
Congress openly stated its intention to encourage the "vocational
rehabilitation and independent living" of handicapped persons through
the "guarantee of equal opportunity."''4 The handicapped person, one
Senate report explained, "is all too often excluded from schools and edu-
cational programs, barred from employment or is underemployed be-
cause of archaic attitudes toward the handicapped, denied access to
transportation, buildings and housing because of architectural barriers
and lack of planning, and is discriminated against by our public laws."'4'
Congress therefore passed the Rehabilitation Act after realizing that a
pernicious, though often not conscious, prejudice harmed disabled citi-
zens by denying them educational, employment, and other opportunities
comparable to those enjoyed by the majority of Americans.42
Yet in protecting the handicapped from such discrimination, Con-
36. 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979); see also Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,
595 (1983) (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (quoting Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979)).
37. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977) ("legislative
history of Section 504 is bereft of much explanation").
38. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
39. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1946); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402 & n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Tihis Court has
authorized ... relief [in the form of damages] where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate
the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute.").
40. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
41. S. REP. No. 319, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
42. Cf 118 CONG. R~c. 3320-21 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams) (noting the existence of
unequal opportunity for handicapped persons while introducing a bill and a resolution to study and
to coordinate programs for the handicapped).
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gress chose to regulate only programs that accepted federal funds. 43 In-
deed, the Act states that "[t]he purpose of this Act is ... to authorize
programs" to provide opportunities for the handicapped.44 It can be ar-
gued that Congress, in selecting this scheme of regulation, sought to pro-
tect group rights and advance group opportunities4s rather than to
protect the rights of individual victims of discrimination. 46 Accordingly,
enforcement of an individual's rights where enforcement would impinge
on the opportunities available to the group would seem to be contrary to
congressional purpose. In this sense, it could be argued that compensa-
tory relief should not be available under section 504, because the pay-
ment of money awards decreases the funds available to the program in
question, and thereby diminishes the overall availability of group
opportunities.47
In another sense, however, an award of compensatory damages in
an action brought by an individual handicapped person against a dis-
criminatory program enhances the opportunities available to all handi-
capped persons. The availability of compensatory relief encourages
federally funded programs to provide the legislatively mandated opportu-
nities for handicapped persons; in short, it deters discrimination.48 Thus,
43. Section 504 prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons only in programs and
activities receiving federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
44. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat. 355, 357 (emphasis added)
(section entitled "Declaration of Purpose"). This statement of purpose was amended by the 1978
amendments, supra note 8, to state that the purpose "was to develop and implement... comprehen-
sive programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living." 1978 amendments, supra note 8,
§ 2, 92 Stat. 2955, 2984 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982)).
45. See Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 471-73 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(finding that Congress created an individual cause of action to facilitate enforcement, not to create a
right to damages).
46. Title VII, which prohibits racial discrimination in employment practices, authorizes relief
sufficient to make the aggrieved individuals whole, i.e., place them in the position they would have
occupied but for the discriminatory practices. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
763 (1976). Compensatory relief can be granted regardless of financial consequences to the private
employer. Such relief may have a net effect of eliminating opportunities for of minority employees.
Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 536 (2d ed. 1977) (noting that laws forbidding
discrimination in workplace may not improve net welfare of victims of discrimination); Landes, The
Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507, 523-24 (1968) (empirical study noting
that laws requiring blacks to be paid as much as whites caused disemployment of blacks).
47. See Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 473 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(awarding damages would be inconsistent with purposes of Rehabilitation Act).
48. Richard Posner makes the same point in discussing the relationship of negligence and com-
pensatory damages in the law of torts:
The association of negligence with purely compensatory damages has prompted the errone-
ous impression that liability for negligence is intended solely as a device for compensation.
Its economic function is different; it is to deter uneconomical accidents. As it happens, the
right amount of deterrence is produced by compelling negligent injurers to make good the
victim's losses. Were they forced to pay more (punitive damages), some economical acci-
dents might also be deterred; were they permitted to pay less than compensation, some
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to the extent that compensatory relief enhances the opportunities of
handicapped persons as a group, its availability is justifiable as a means
to effectuate the congressional purpose.4 9
2. Administrative Remedies. In determining whether a damages
remedy should be available under a statute creating liability, courts often
first ask whether the rights afforded by the statute are sufficiently safe-
guarded by administrative remedies.50 Although a handicapped individ-
ual alleging discrimination is entitled to file a complaint with the federal
agency that funds the activity in question,51 the administrative remedies
available to correct violations of section 504 are, for the most part, inade-
quate. In the first place, vigorous enforcement of section 504 is unlikely.
As one commentator explained:
Because a particular [federal] agency is responsible for both enforcing
section 504 and implementing the programs a section 504 complaint
will necessarily attack, there is a built-in conflict of interest and a re-
sulting reluctance to enforce section 504. Self-survival dictates that
agencies attempt to look as effective as possible in the implementation
of their programs. Similarly, close relationships are naturally devel-
oped between agencies and those programs and other recipients they
fund. It is impractical to expect these same agencies to strain estab-
lished relationships by stringent enforcement of section 504.52
Because of this inherent conflict of interest, one cannot reasonably antici-
pate that federal agencies will sufficiently protect victims' interests. En-
forcement of section 504 will be, at best, a secondary goal.
Moreover, an individual who files a complaint with the appropriate
agency has no guarantee of a thorough administrative inquiry. The regu-
lations of the Department of Health and Human Services, for example,
give the complainant no explicit right to take part in the agency's investi-
gation 53 or seek review of agency findings.54 Moreover, the complainant
uneconomical accidents would not be deterred. It is thus essential that the defendant be
made to pay damages ....
IL POSN R, supra note 46, at 143.
49. Because the availability of compensatory relief to private plaintiffs also has the potential to
eliminate group opportunities by reducing the funds available to programs aiding the handicapped,
defining the standard of conduct that triggers compensatory relief is crucial. See infra notes 82-120
and accompanying text (discussing different standards for recovery).
50. See Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 977-78 (8th Cir.) (discussing inadequacy of adminis-
trative remedies and determining that damages remedy is available under section 504), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 909 (1982); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1381 (10th Cir. 1982)
(same).
51. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1985) (HHS rule for title VI, applicable to the Rehabilitation
Act pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1985)).
52. Comment, supra note 5, at 587 (citations omitted).
53. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(c) (1985) (HHS rule for title VI, applicable to the Rehabilitation
Act pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1985)).
54. Id. § 80.7(d)(2).
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is not a party to any proceedings resulting from the complaint, but may
only petition to become an amicus curiae.55 In short, a disabled person
can gain "little comfort" from the languid enforcement such regulatory
provisions countenance,5 6 and violators of the Act can only be en-
couraged by the obstacles thus posed to effective administrative
enforcement.
Additionally, the remedies available under the regulations are not
sufficiently attractive to encourage the victims of discrimination to pur-
sue a complaint and are inadequate to deter misconduct in the first place.
The administrative procedures promulgated under the Rehabilitation
Act furnish no means by which a disabled person who has been injured
by discriminatory treatment can be compensated; the availability of pro-
spective relief neither provides an adequate inducement to private plain-
tiffs to bring suit nor encourages recipients of federal funding to take
steps before a complaint is filed to correct conditions violative of section
504. The most severe administrative sanction-the termination of fed-
eral financial support to defendant programs57-is seldom employed.58
Moreover, the imposition of this sanction only has the effect of punishing
the program. The complainant and other handicapped individuals are
not aided by the termination of funds, and the purpose of the Act is thus
defeated.5 9 Without the possibility of a damage award, plaintiffs with
meritorious claims may well be discouraged from pursuing section 504
actions. By encouraging victims of section 504 violations to sue, a dam-
ages remedy effectuates congressional purpose more fully than does the
administrative enforcement currently in place.60
55. Id, § 81.23.
56. Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982).
57. See, eg., 45 C.F.R. § 80.8 (1985) (HHS rule).
58. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 626-27 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (statutory fund cutoff cannot adequately provide compensation or ensure compliance
with the law); see also Lamber, Private Causes of Action Under Federal Agency Nondiscrimination
Statutes, 10 CoNN. L. REv. 859, 888 n.150 (1978) (because of its extreme and harsh nature, cutoff
sanction only employed three times in first fourteen years following enactment of title VI).
59. See Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 135 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981).
60. Some courts, though acknowledging the availability of a private right of action, have held
that a section 504 plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a private action.
See, eg., Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768, 771 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 720 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied and appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1201
(1984); Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110, 117 (W.D. Pa. 1978). But see Miener v. Missouri, 673
F.2d 969, 978-79 (8th Cir.) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not required), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 909 (1982); Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), rev'd on
other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 300 (1985). Those courts rejecting the exhaustion requirement seem to
have the better argument, at least with respect to federal administrative remedies. In Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected an exhaustion requirement
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3. Lower Federal Courts. Some lower federal courts have con-
cluded that damages may be awarded to vindicate rights established by
section 504.61 In Miener v. Missouri,62 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized the need for a dam-
ages remedy, noting that other remedial procedures were "inadequate"
to protect the rights of handicapped personsA3 Although it disallowed
recovery of damages from state officials on eleventh amendment grounds,
the court read section 504 to allow a damages remedy.64 And in Christo-
pher N. v. McDaniel,65 a federal district court, referring to the general
principle that the right to seek compensatory relief for violations of a
citizen's personal liberty is "an accepted feature of the American judicial
system," likewise held that damages may be awarded to section 504
plaintiffs. 66
In Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Independent School District,67 however, a
federal district court concluded otherwise. The court determined that
Congress intended to establish a judicial remedy to protect the entitle-
ment of disabled individuals to equal opportunity.6 8 The court held,
however, that this remedy was limited to injunctive or declaratory re-
lief.69 Although it recognized that a damages remedy would enhance the
for a private action under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Id. at 706 n.42. Both title
IX and section 504 are modeled on title VI. See supra note 35.
61. See Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984) (damages
available upon proof of discriminatory intent); Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d
1348, 1357 (5th Cir. 1983) (same) (dictum); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 977-79 (8th Cir.)
(damages available), cert denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132, 1138
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (damages available upon proof of discriminatory intent); Hurry v. Jones, 560 F.
Supp. 500, 511-12 (D.R.I. 1983) (damages available), rev'd in part on other grounds, 734 F.2d 879
(1st Cir. 1984); Wilder v. City of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (damages
available without proof of discriminatory intent); Christopher N. v. McDaniel, 569 F. Supp. 291,
296 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (damages available); Gelman v. Department of Educ., 544 F. Supp. 651, 653-54
(D. Colo. 1982) (same); Hutchings v. Erie City & County Library Bd., 516 F. Supp. 1265, 1268-69
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (same); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 937-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); see
aflo Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1983) (assuming with-
out deciding that section 504 provides damages remedy). But see Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp,
102, 106-07 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (damages remedy not available); Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School
Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 469-73 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (damages remedy would frustrate underlying legis-
lative purpose); Carter v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 550 F. Supp. 172, 174 (W.D. Okla. 1981)
(damages unavailable under Rehabilitation Act); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F.
Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (although the Act was probably intended as private supplement
to government enforcement, it does not provide new entitlement to damages).
62. 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982).
63. Id. at 978.
64. Id at 979.
65. 569 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
66. Id. at 296 (citing Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
67. 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
68. Id. at 471.
69. Id
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enforceability of section 504, the Ruth Anne court stated that an award
of compensatory relief would contravene the goal underlying the Reha-
bilitation Act.70 The court explained:
[T]he Court does not perceive a damage remedy as entirely consistent
with the legislative purpose underlying the Rehabilitation Act. Con-
gress enacted the Rehabilitation Act to promote and expand opportu-
nities in the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals.
Congress sought to achieve this purpose in Section 504 of the Act by
conditioning the receipt of funds on the promise of equal opportunities
in programs or services so funded. However, the implication of a dam-
age remedy would portend a potentially massive financial liability
upon recipients of federal funds, possibly in excess of the amount of
funds received. This exposure could serve a significant disincentive to
the solicitation or acceptance of federal financial assistance, and hence
a significant deterrent to the promotion and expansion of opportunities
for handicapped individuals through funding legislation.71
The Ruth Anne court tacitly assumed that a damages remedy would
be available in every case in which a section 504 violation was proved.
By separating the question of the availability of relief from the standard
for recovery, however, the Ruth Anne court simply set up a straw man
which it could easily knock down. The availability of a damages remedy
in a section 504 action, if appropriately limited, is fully consistent with
the congressional purpose of enhancing group opportunity. 72
4. The Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court has rou-
tinely permitted a damages remedy under other statutes enacted by Con-
gress to guarantee the civil rights of various classes of American
citizens, 73 the Court has not rendered an opinion specifically addressing
the availability of a damages remedy under section 504.74 In fact, the
70. Id. at 473.
71. Id.; see also Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Boxall v. Sequoia
Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
72. See infra notes 100-20 and accompanying text. The vitality of the Ruth Anne conclusion is
in doubt, even in the court that decided the case. Ruth Anne was decided before the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). In Guardi-
ans, a majority of the Justices took the position that compensatory relief is available in title VI
actions. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. Because section 505(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a(a)(2) (1982), makes all of the remedies provided to plaintiffs under title VI available under
section 504, a significant issue was not considered in Ruth Anne.
73. See, eg., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-25 (1975) (availability of dam-
ages under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (availability of compensatory and punitive
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969)
(permitting damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
74. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020 n.24 (1984), the Court stated: "Without expres-
sing an opinion on the matter, we note that courts generally agree that damages are available under
§ 504...."
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Court recently declined to decide the extent to which a section 504 plain-
tiff could recover damages. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 75 the
plaintiff sued his former employer for compensatory relief, alleging that
the railroad had violated his rights under section 504 by refusing to re-
hire him following a work-related accident that left him unable to use
one of his arms.76 The defendant argued that the case had been mooted
by the death of the plaintiff. The Court disagreed with the defendant.
Expressly reserving the question of the extent of a damages remedy, it
held that the case was not moot because section 504 authorizes an equita-
ble action for back pay where the plaintiff alleges intentional
discrimination. 77
Although the Supreme Court has not yet found it necessary to de-
fine the scope of relief available under section 504, the availability of a
damages remedy under that section can be logically inferred from the
separate opinions in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission. 7
In Guardians, black and Hispanic members of New York City's police
department brought suit to challenge the department's "last hired, first
fired" employment policy. These plaintiffs contended that job layoffs re-
sulting from the policy constituted racial discrimination in the workplace
in violation of title V.7 9 Directing its attention to the remedies available
under the statute, a majority of Court agreed that compensatory relief
may be awarded in title VI actions.80 Because section 505(a)(2) of the
Rehabilitation Act provides that title VI remedies are to be available to
section 504 claimants, Guardians implies by analogy the existence of
compensatory relief under section 504.81
75. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
76. Id at 628.
77. Id at 630-31.
78. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
79. Id. at 585-86.
80. Id. at 607 n.27 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
81. It might be asserted that despite section 505(a)(2), Guardians does not support the existence
of a damages remedy under section 504 because the Rehabilitation Act and title VI proscribe differ-
ent types of discrimination. Indeed, title VI prohibits employment related racial discrimination, a
form of unequal treatment that arguably results more from intentional disfavor than does unequal
treatment of the handicapped. Thus, a more potent remedy may have been made available under
title VI in order to discourage such purposeful misconduct. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have generally referred to
section 505(a)(2) when contemplating the relief available to successful section 504 complainants.
These courts have expressly relied on the literal wording of section 505(a)(2). See, eg., Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 631 (1984); Carter v. Orlans Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d
261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984); Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
208 [Vol. 1986:197
Vol. 1986:197] DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 504
II. STANDARDS FOR RECOVERY OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Guardians did not suggest that every complainant who presents
proof of title VI violations will recover compensatory relief. Despite the
argument advanced by four of the Justices that both prospective and ret-
roactive relief were fully available to title VI plaintiffs without regard to
intent,8 2 a majority of the Court limited compensatory awards to cases in
which the defendant had deliberately discriminated. 83
Relying on the Guardians opinion and the language contained in
section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, some courts have held that
only plaintiffs injured by intentional violations of section 504 may receive
compensatory relief.84 As the Supreme Court recently cautioned how-
ever, "[T]oo facile an assimilation of Title VI law to § 504 must be re-
sisted."' ' s Although the recognition in Guardians that compensatory
relief is available under title VI strongly suggests that damages are recov-
erable under section 504, to limit compensatory relief to situations in-
volving intentional misconduct seems inappropriate, if not unsound,
when applied to section 504 plaintiffs. Section 505(a)(2) merely provides
that the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI" are avail-
able to section 504 plaintiffs. 86 Nothing in section 505(a)(2) requires that
a 504 plaintiff seeking a certain form of relief make a showing of all the
elements necessary for the same relief in a title VI dispute. 87 Indeed, in
82. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 626-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 636-39 (Stevens, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
83. Id. at 597-603 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court, joined in part
by Rehnquist, J.); id. at 610-11 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that no
private right of action exists under title VI); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A majority of the
Justices also were of the opinion that title VI was in fact only violated by intentional discrimination.
Id. at 610-11 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and in part by Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 612
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 641-42 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissent-
ing). Only Justices White and Marshall believed that a violation of title VI was proven by a showing
of discriminatory effects. Id. at 584 n.2 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court); id. at 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting). White, however, would award only prospective relief in
such situations. Id. at 602-03 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Three
Justices argued that a showing of discriminatory effects would be sufficient to prove a violation under
the regulations issued under title VI. Id. at 643-45 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun,
J.J., dissenting). Together with White and Marshall, a different majority thus exists for the award of
prospective relief upon a showing of discriminatory effects. i
84. See Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984); Marvin H. v.
Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356-57 (5th Cir. 1983); Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp.
1132, 1137 38 (E.D. Pa. 1984). But see Wilder v. City of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1136
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (discriminatory intent unnecessary for award of damages).
85. Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 717 n.7 (1985).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2) (1982).
87. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), for example, the Court re-
jected the imposition on section 504 of the "primary objective" requirement of title VI. Id. at 635.
That requirement limits the applicability of title VI to employment practices where the "primary
objective" of federal financial aid is to provide employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982).
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Alexander v. Choate,88 the Supreme Court recognized that although a
majority in Guardians held that a violation of title VI requires intentional
discrimination, 9 the reach of section 504 is not similarly confined and
extends to some forms of unintentional discrimination. 90 The Court rec-
ognized that title VI and section 504 address historically and socially
distinct types of discrimination through statutory prohibitions that differ
in coverage.91 Accordingly, the intent requirement announced in Guard-
ians should not control the determination whether compensatory relief is
available under section 504.
A. An Intent Requirement.
Both title VI and section 504 resulted from congressional efforts to
end unfavorable treatment of classes historically subjected to discrimina-
tion. The disfavor that handicapped persons generally face, however, dif-
fers from that which the black community encounters. Unlike blacks,
disabled persons do not suffer from unequal treatment stemming from
overt discriminatory animus.92 Instead, handicapped individuals are
often denied equal opportunity because of inattention to their special
needs.93 The absence of curb ramps or the construction of narrow walk-
ways, for example, frequently result from oversights and are not part of a
deliberate strategy to disfavor disabled persons. Congress recognized
this aspect of handicapped discrimination, stating: "[T]he American
people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to difficulties con-
fronted by handicapped individuals and lack adequate knowledge about
their potential for contribution to society."'94
Thus, the statutory scheme that Congress created acknowledges the
modest role that intent plays in discrimination against the handicapped.
In order to prove a violation of section 504, a plaintiff must show that he
88. 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
89. Id. at 716-17; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
90. Alexander, 105 S. Ct. at 717-21. For a discussion of the type of unintended discrimination
that violates section 504, see infra notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
91. Alexander, 105 S. Ct. at 718-19; see also infra notes 92-94, 97-99 and accompanying text.
92. See J. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 3-4 (1972) (racial discrimination results from "those
actions designed to maintain" whites' favored position at expense of other groups) (emphasis added).
Jones acknowledges that some forms of institutional racism may not be intended. Id. at 6, 148. The
Supreme Court also has recognized that racial discrimination frequently results from overt racial
animus. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1982). See
generally Wegner, supra note 5, at 436.
93. See infra note 94; see also Wegner, supra note 5, at 429-34 (describing the differing histori.
cal contexts of racial and handicap discrimination).
94. S. REP. No. 319, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973); see also Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712,
718 (1985) (noting Congress's perception that discrimination against the handicapped is largely
inadvertent).
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or she is a "handicapped person" under the Act, who is "otherwise quali-
fied" for participation in a program receiving federal financial assistance,
and who is being excluded from participation in, being denied the bene-
fits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program solely by
reason of his or her handicap. 95
Requiring a showing of discriminatory intent as a requisite for com-
pensatory relief is consistent with the type of prejudice title VI pros-
cribes, because racial discrimination tends to be deliberate rather than
inadvertent.96 Thus, compensatory relief remains available to discourage
or to provide reparation in cases involving such discrimination. Given
the often inadvertent nature of the unequal treatment proscribed by sec-
tion 504, however, restricting damage awards under that section to cases
involving discriminatory purpose effectively precludes recovery of dam-
ages by a vast number of section 504 claimants. Such a damages remedy
would be a hollow deterrent; because individual plaintiffs would rarely
recover monetary damages, the threat of an adverse judgment would pro-
vide a weak incentive to federally funded programs to avoid section 504
violations.
Furthermore, though Congress expressly limited title VI's coverage
to only those federally funded programs whose "primary objective" was
to provide employment, 97 section 504 contains no such limitation, cover-
ing instead "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." 98 A requirement of discriminatory intent as a requisite for
compensatory relief would drastically reduce the protection such expan-
sive coverage was designed to afford. Many disabled citizens who sus-
tained losses from inadvertent denials of opportunities to enjoy federally
aided educational, rehabilitative, transportation, recreational, and em-
ployment services would not be able to bring a suit for damages despite
the extensive coverage that section 504 accords and despite the necessity
of encouraging private enforcement. 99 Without the deterrent effect that
damages liability provides, disfavorable treatment is likely to recur.
Though widely applicable, section 504 will still not respond adequately
to the needs of its benefited class if a plaintiff is required to prove inten-
tional discrimination in order to recover damages.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see also Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir.
1981); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981).
96. See supra note 92.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (emphasis added). In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S.
624, 635 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the "primary objective" limitation of title VI was not
applicable to section 504 by virtue of the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act.
99. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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B. An Effects Test.
In the Rehabilitation Act Congress concentrated on helping handi-
capped persons overcome the effects of discrimination; it appeared less
concerned with whether the person responsible for the unequal treatment
acted intentionally. '0 It is therefore logical to assume that compensa-
tory relief should be available whenever discriminatory effects are
proven.
It can be argued, however, that requiring proof only of discrimina-
tory effects will result in the situation portended by the Ruth Anne court:
potential recipients of federal funds shunning such funds out of fear of
potential damages liability.101 Indeed, the elements needed to establish a
violation of section 504 necessarily satisfy an effects requirement. 0 2 A
claimant has demonstrated discriminatory effects once he or she proves
that, as an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual,"'' 0 3 he or she has
been denied full participation in a federally assisted activity solely be-
cause of a handicap.104 Thus, under a standard that requires a showing
of discriminatory effects, any complainant who could prove a violation of
section 504 would be entitled to compensatory relief.
Close examination of the responsibilities of fund recipients under the
Act, however, reveals that this concern for widespread liability under an
effects test is exaggerated. As the Supreme Court recently recognized in
Alexander v. Choate, 105 not all showings of discriminatory effects consti-
tute violations of section 504.106 Section 504 only prohibits discrimina-
tion against an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual "solely by
reason of his handicap."10 7 The Supreme Court has stated that this lan-
guage means that funded programs cannot assume that an individual is
not qualified for participation in the program merely because that indi-
vidual is handicapped. 0 8 Thus, although "[s]ection 504 seeks to assure
evenhanded treatment and the opportunity for handicapped individuals
to participate in and benefit from programs receiving federal assist-
100. See supra notes 40-42, 94-95 and accompanying text; see also Wegner, supra note 5, at 433-
34 (section 504 is concerned with discriminatory effect, not violator's state of mind).
101. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
104. Id.
105. 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
106. Id. at 720-21.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (emphasis added).
108. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). The Court defined
"otherwise qualified" as follows: "An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all the
program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Id. at 406.
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ance,"' 0 9 it requires neither that programs totally disregard handicaps1
nor that they make more than reasonable accommodations for handi-
capped individuals."'
Though not expressly identified in section 504, the existence of a
duty of reasonable accommodation is now well established. In Southeast-
ern Community College v. Davis, " 2 the Supreme Court held that section
504 does not compel administrators to initiate "substantial modifica-
tions" of their federally aided activities for the sake of a disabled per-
son.1 3 The Court added, however, that "situations may arise where a
refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory.""14 Thus, although it held that section 504 does not re-
quire major adjustment of the essential elements of a federally assisted
program when such adjustment may prove too expensive or too funda-
mental, the Court implied that the statute does require program opera-
tors to institute modest modifications that entail no severe financial or
administrative difficulties." 5 More recently, in Alexander v. Choate,116
the Court expressly endorsed the reasonable accommodation approach of
Southeastern Community College as striking an appropriate balance be-
tween the rights of handicapped individuals to be integrated into society
and the interests of federal grantees in the continued integrity of their
programs. "17
A showing that a federal fund recipient has violated section 504 thus
requires more than a demonstration of discriminatory effects. Plaintiffs
must show that they were "otherwise qualified." Fund recipients can
rebut an allegation of discrimination by demonstrating that their actions
were motivated by legitimate considerations, such as cost and safety, and
109. Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712,722 (1985) (citing Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)).
110. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979).
111. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
112. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
113. Id. at 413. For a recent court opinion discussing the extent to which administrators should
provide accommodation, see Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1420, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1985).
114. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 412-13.
115. Id. at 412; see also New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847,
853 (10th Cir. 1982).
116. 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
117. Id. at 720-21. Rules promulgated under section 504 refer to this duty. Two such regula-
tions, for example, provide: "A [federal aid] recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee
unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of its program." 34 C.F.R. § 104.12(a) (1985) (Department of Education rules); see
also 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1985) (identical language in HHS rules).
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not solely by the plaintift's handicap.1 18 Where no such justifications ex-
ist, and full participation in a federally funded program could have been
accomplished without unreasonable modification thereof, section 504 is
violated 19 and compensatory relief is appropriate and necessary for the
enforcement of its antidiscrimination mandate.
Nor should such liability be unexpected. The directors of all feder-
ally aided programs have the legal responsibility of avoiding liability
under section 504: For example, the regulations promulgated under sec-
tion 504 place on fund recipients a duty to conduct an evaluation of their
programs for section 504 compliance. This entails consultation with in-
terested persons, including handicapped individuals or organizations rep-
resenting them. 120 Limiting section 504 plaintiffs to prospective relief
would dissuade federal fund recipients from attempting to discover, eval-
uate, and remove discriminatory obstacles. Far from being inconsistent
with the intent of Congress, damage awards are necessary to fulfill the
congressional purpose.
III. CONCLUSION
In determining whether section 504 affords a private right of action
for money damages, consideration of congressional purpose is para-
mount. Section 504 requires that recipients of federal funds provide
handicapped persons equal opportunity. In selecting this scheme of reg-
ulation, Congress sought to protect group rights and advance group op-
portunities. Group opportunities are advanced when programs comply
with section 504; they are not advanced when programs reject federal
funds as an alternative to complying with the Act.
Because administrative remedies and prospective relief generally are
far from adequate to provide an incentive for compliance with section
504, such incentive must be supplied by the availability of private actions
for money damages. In keeping with congressional purpose, however,
the right to money damages must be qualified. The need to provide an
incentive to programs to make the reasonable accommodations required
under section 504 must be balanced against the threat that a great
number of successful damage actions will cause programs to reject fed-
eral aid, and, consequently, to deny participation to the handicapped.
118. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1985) (recognizing as
legitimate a university admissions policy aimed at insuring that no graduate pose a danger to the
public in a professional role); see also Wegner, supra note 5, at 444, 451-52 (use of cost, safety or
other justification to rebut allegation of discrimination).
119. See Wegner, supra note 5, at 444 (absent justification, it can be assumed refusal to accom-
modate was solely motivated by the handicap).
120. See, ag., 45 C.F.R. § 84.6(c) (1985) (HHS rules imposing duty to self evaluate).
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This note has examined two standards for allowing recovery of
money damages: intentional discrimination and discriminatory effects.
Only the latter standard can reach the type of discrimination Congress
sought to proscribe and provide the proper level of incentive to federally
funded programs to provide reasonable accommodation for the handi-
capped. Without such an incentive, the Act's guarantee of equal oppor-
tunity for the handicapped is a hollow promise.
John D. Briggs

